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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

NOTES AND COMMENTS

FREEDOM AT RISK: THE IMPLICATIONS OF CITY OF BOERNE V.
FLORES ON THE MERGER OF CATHOLIC AND NON-CATHOLIC
HOSPITALS

In recent years the health care industry in the United State has witnessed a
significant increase in the number of non-profit, Catholic hospitals merging
with for-profit, non-Catholic hospitals or health care systems.1 Catholic
hospitals are integral health care providers, comprising the largest portion of
private sector health care in the United States.2 In many areas, Catholic
hospitals remain the largest providers of available health services.3 However,
the number of Catholic hospitals merging with non-Catholic facilities has
dramatically increased in recent years.4
In 1993, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”)5 to protect individual religious freedom.6 In June of 1997, the
Supreme Court invalidated the Act in City of Boerne v. Flores.7 The Court’s
decision may have vast implications for employees and patients affected by the
Catholic health-care network in the United States.
This Comment traces the history of RFRA from its roots in Employment
Division v. Smith through the Supreme Court’s decision in Boerne. This
comment will also explore the current status of the Free Exercise Clause in
light of Boerne. Only with such a background can there be a full examination

1. Janet Gallagher, Religious Freedom, Reproductive Health Care, and Hospital Mergers,
52 JAMWA 65 (1997).
2. Jane Hochberg, The Sacred Heart Story: Hospital Mergers and Their Effects on
Reproductive Rights, 75 OR. L. REV. 945, 949 (1996).
3. Id.
4. Id at 949. In 1994, there were over one hundred mergers, affiliations, and joint ventures
between Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals, managed care organizations, and other providers.
Id.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
6. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
7. Id. at 2158.
157
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of the negative impact that Catholic hospital mergers have on accessibility of
reproductive and community health care in the United States.
I. THE MERGER OF CATHOLIC AND NON-CATHOLIC HOSPITALS
The Catholic health care network is the largest provider of health services
in the United States. Catholic hospitals treat over fifty million patients
annually, comprising sixteen percent of hospital services nationwide.8
According to Catholics For Free Choice, in 1990, Catholic hospitals generated
1.6 billion in net income and managed $38 billion in assets.9 In addition, the
Catholic health care system includes about 542 hospitals and provides about
fifteen percent of all health care.10
Both Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals around the country are merging
or forming integrated delivery systems (“IDS”) with other hospitals and health
care providers.11 Providers argue that the mergers are “a necessary trend in the
era of rising health care costs and emphasis on economic reform.”12 Hospitals
facing economic pressures hope to merge in order to minimize costs and often
times just to remain open.13 This trend began in the 1980s and has continued
in full force into the 1990s, spurred in part by President William Clinton’s
drive for health care reform and the likely economic ramifications of it.14 In
addition, many Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals merge in order to be more
competitive in the quest to obtain managed care contracts.15 Many nonsectarian hospitals find the need to merge with Catholic hospitals in order to
obtain economic security.16
8. Merge with Care (last modified 1996) <http://www.rcrc.org/pubs/speakout/merg.html>
[hereinafter Merge].
9. Lisa C. Ikemoto. When a Hospital Becomes Catholic, 47 MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1092
(1995).
10. Karen Brandon, Catholic Hospitals Pacts Cut Birth Control Services, CHI. TRIB., Jul. 12,
1998, at A20.
11. Hochberg, supra note 2, at 949. A 1994 survey of 1,143 hospitals and 41 health systems
revealed that 24 percent already belonged to an integrated delivery system while 71 percent said
that they already belonged to or are developing an IDS. Frank Cerne, The Fading Stand-Alone
Hosp, HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS, June 20, 1994, at 28- 29. According to Modern Healthcare
magazine, in 1997, 627 hospitals were merged with or acquired, an eighteen percent drop from
the 768 mergers and acquisitions in 1996. Hospital Consolidation Slows, Paced by Columbia/
HCA (visited October. 1997) <http://www.modernhealthcare.com>.
12. Hochberg, supra note 2, at 949, citing Shari Roan, When the Church and Medicine
Clash More Hospitals are Merging with Catholic Facilities to Survive, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995,
at A1.
13. Brandon, supra note 10.
14. Ikemoto, supra note 9, at 1093.
15. Gallagher, supra note 1, at 65.
16. “Nationwide, hundreds of hospitals, faced with intense pressure to lower costs and a
reduced need for inpatient beds, are affiliating to remain financially solvent.” Henry L. Davis,
Falls, Batavia Mergers Take Toll on Reproductive Services, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 16, 1998, at 1A.
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Catholic hospitals have been willing participants in this “merger mania.”17
From 1990 to 1997, approximately 84 partnerships were formed between
Catholic and non-Catholic medical institutions.18 In 1996 alone, Catholic
hospitals were involved in twenty-nine such reorganizations.19 Further
evidencing this merger trend, the 1994 National Conference of Catholic
Bishops revised the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Services (“Directives”) to include a section on “Forming New Partnerships
with Health Care Organizations and Providers.”20 This section gives hospitals
and providers assistance in organizing Catholic and non-Catholic
collaborations.21
A. The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services
Catholic hospitals operate under the Directives published by the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops (“NCCB”).22 The Directives consist of a set
of principles drawn from a “faith-inspired vision of the human person” that are
applied on a case-by-case basis.23 The purpose of the Directives as stated in
the Preamble is twofold: first, to reaffirm the ethical standards of behavior in
healthcare that flow from the Church’s teaching about the dignity of a human
person; second, to provide authoritative guidance on certain moral issues that
face Catholic healthcare today.24
Catholic leaders initially created the ethical norms for Catholic healthcare
facilities in the 1940s and 1950s.25 However, these ethical norms were
unauthorized and had no canonical force until they were approved by a bishop
for his diocese.26 Therefore, they were not consistently followed and
“geographic morality” resulted.27 In 1971, a new set of Directives was

17. Brandon, supra note 10.
18. Id.
19. Michael Casey, NY Catholic Healthcare Providers Expected to Unite, MED. INDUSTRY
TODAY, Jan. 15, 1998.
20. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
Health Care Services, (last modified November 1994).<http://www.usc.edu/hsc/info/newman/
resources>[hereinafter Directives]. See also Ikemoto, supra note 9, at 1093.
21. Id.
22. Directives, supra note 20.
23. Sr. Jean Deblois & Rev. Kevin D. O’Rourke, Introducing the Revised Directives: What
Do They Mean for Catholic Healthcare?, HEALTH PROGRESS, Apr. 1995, at 18.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 19.
26. Id.
27. Deblois & O’Rourke, supra note 23, at 19. “Geographic morality” meant that each
diocese would interpret and apply the Directives differently. This caused dissonance since what
was prohibited in one diocese often would be authorized in another. Id.
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approved by the NCCB with minor corrections made in 1975.28 In 1988, a
subcommittee of the Committee on Doctrine of the NCCB coordinated with
several agencies to revise the Directives in light of new medicinal technology
and various social and legal changes in the United States.29 In 1994, the
revised and now official Directives were presented.30 The Directives became a
binding force when the NCCB approved them and local bishops promulgated
them.31 Currently, the Directives are the “discipline for all healthcare facilities
in the United States that are affiliated with the Catholic Church.”32
B. The Effect of Mergers Between Catholic and Non-Catholic Hospitals
When Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals merge, Catholic hospitals often
impose religious controls on services.33 Catholic hospitals have leverage to
impose such limitations because of their strong financial position.34 The nonCatholic hospital often agrees as part of a consolidation agreement to follow
Catholic doctrine and to refrain from participating in procedures explicitly
prohibited by the Church.35 As a result, certain community health services are
28. Id. at 20. The 1971 Directives did not address the “ethical issue concerning sterilization
to avoid the physiological pathologies predictable because of pregnancy.” Id. In 1975, the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith found that these sterilizations were contraceptive in
nature and therefore prohibited by the Directives. Id. For example, a tubal ligation performed to
avoid a disorder that would occur if a woman became pregnant is classified as a physiological
pathology predictable because of pregnancy.
29. Id. Five agencies gathered to assist the NCCB with this project: CHA, the Pope John
XXIII Center, the Center for Health Care Ethics/Saint Louis University Health Sciences Center,
the Medical-Moral Board of the Archdiocese of San Francisco, and the Kennedy Institute of
Ethics at Georgetown University. Deblois & O’Rourke, supra note 23, at 20.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 21.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Merge, supra note 8. Secular hospitals are consistently struggling to lower costs and are
facing a reduced need for inpatient beds. Catholic hospitals are strong financially, in part, because
they are the largest provider of non-profit health care in the country. Davis, supra note 15. In
New York, Moody’s Investors Service reported that multistate non-profit health systems had a
median budget of approximately $450 million to spend on acquisitions in 1996. This places nonprofits in a position for potential growth. Casey, supra note 19. See also Howard J. Anderson,
Catholic Hospitals Join Forces With Non-Catholic Competitors (Developing Stronger Regional
Systems of Care), HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS, October 20, 1990.
35. Casey, supra note 19. According to Casey, this has been a deal maker or breaker in
several recent cases. In Upstate New York, two secular hospitals (Northern Dutchess Hospital,
and Kingston Medical Center) negotiated a merger with a Catholic hospital (Roman Catholic
Benedictine Hospital) only after agreeing to abide by the Directives; In addition, in another New
York merger, a small secular hospital, Genessee Memorial Hospital, and a Catholic hospital, St.
Jerome Hospital, agreed to a merger only after promising to build an independent, freestanding
health clinic to provide reproductive health services for women. This is not unique to New York;
over 100 mergers or affiliations had similar results. See Casey, supra note 19. See also John
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eliminated which disproportionately affect women.36 Between 1990-95, 57
mergers and affiliations took place between Catholic and non-Catholic
hospitals, “10 resulted in the complete elimination of reproductive health
services for women; 12 compromised, allowing the continuation of
reproductive services in the non-Catholic hospital; 6 allowed the services to be
performed at legally separate clinics.”37
The Directives set forth direct prohibitions on the distribution of the
morning-after pill,38 the use of assisted contraception methods,39 and
abortion.40 In addition, the Directives also place restrictions on prenatal testing
and genetic screening,41 contraception,42 and sterilization.43

Morrissey, Catholics Call It Off: Bishop Scuttles R.I. Merger With Secular Network, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Dec. 15, 1997, at 6 (discussing how the Roman Catholic Bishop in Providence,
Rhode Island called off a proposed merger between Catholic and non-Catholic providers because
of a dispute over the Catholic providers adherence to the Directives and the refusal to perform
abortions, sterilizations and other procedures that violate the Directives). In Chicago, Illinois,
Westlake Community Hospital and Catholic Resurrection Health Care successfully merged and
agreed to eliminate reproductive services. Bruce Japsen, Health-Care Impasse Resolved;
Resurrections Westlake Doctors to Divert Reproductive Procedures, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 1998 at
1. Also, reproductive services will end at Hoffman Estates Medical Center after Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp. sells the hospital to Roman Catholic Alexian Brothers Health System of Elk
Grove Village. Id. Neither Westlake or Hoffman Estates performed abortion procedures, but both
hospitals argue that there will not be a problem with this because there are many hospitals in the
area that will perform these services. Id.
36. Ikemoto, supra note 9, at 1088. See also Hospital Mergers: The Threat to Reproductive
Health Services (last updated June, 1995) <http:www.aclu.org/library/hospital.html> (discussing
the serious risk to women’s health care because of a declining number of reproductive health care
providers).
37. Mark Hayward, Symptom of Change, THE UNION LEADER, October 19, 1997, at A1.
38. Directives, supra note 20. The morning after pill prevents a fertilized egg from
implanting in a woman’s uterus and is usually used for women who have been raped. Directive
36 permits the use of the morning after pill only if there is no evidence that fertilization has
occurred. Id. Most Catholic leaders have conceded to the discretion of physicians in determining
whether to administer the drug. Michael Hirsley, Bishop Reignites Ethics Struggle; Catholic
Hospital Told to Deny Morning-After Pill to Victims of Rape, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 1994, at N1.
However, at least one Bishop in the Peoria diocese refused to allow the one Catholic hospital in
his diocese that administers the drug, St. Francis, to continue. Id. Illinois state law requires that
the hospital inform rape victims where they can obtain the pill even if the Catholic hospital will
not provide it. Id. One of the problems, though, is that St. Francis hospital is a designated trauma
hospital that treats many rape victims. Id.
39. Directives, supra note 20. Several of the Directives disallow the use of assisted
conception methods for unmarried persons, the use of donated ova and sperm, surrogacy, and any
method that separates marital intercourse from conception. Id.
40. Directive 45 prohibits abortion services and is vehement about it. Id.
41. Directives 50 and 52 restrict their use when the information acquired from these services
might be used to choose abortion. Id.
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According to Francis Kissling of Catholics for Free Choice, abortion is not
the major issue or deal maker or breaker in mergers, since relatively few
hospitals perform abortions anyway. The bigger issue, Kissling says, is the
impact of “merger activity” on contraception, sterilization, assisted
reproduction and emergency contraception following rape.44 According to
Catholics for Free Choice, of 64 mergers and affiliations of Catholic and nonCatholic hospitals nationwide between 1990-97, 48 percent of mergers have
led to the discontinuation of all or some of these services.45
A major concern is that many Catholic hospital patients may not be
cognizant of the restrictions imposed on the available services.46 In a national
survey of women, Catholics for Free Choice discovered that very few women
realize that Catholic facilities are permitted by law and required by Church
officials to bar or limit disapproved health services.47 Only twenty-seven
percent of women surveyed were aware that their access to medical procedures
would be restricted at a Catholic hospital or through a Catholic-sponsored
health plan.48 Women that did know about the existence of such limitations
were unaware of the broad scope of pertinent service restrictions.49
Certain groups of women are more affected by these mergers. Mergers
between Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals have a disparate impact on
women living in rural communities who lack the ability to choose medical
providers.50 When the only two hospitals in an area merge and discontinue
church prohibited community health services, rural women may effectively be
prevented from obtaining these services.51 Rural women also tend to be poorer
and often lack the insurance flexibility that would allow them to gain access to

42. Directive 52 prohibits Catholic hospitals from “condoning contraceptive practices.” This
includes prohibiting Catholic hospitals from informing HIV positive patients on how to avoid
transmission of the virus. Ikemoto, supra note 9, at 1107.
43. The Directives ban direct sterilization procedures intended solely to prevent conception.
Id.
44. Shari Roan, When the Church and Medicine Clash; More Hospitals Are Merging with
Catholic Facilities to Survive. Vital Care is Preserved, but Some Patients Lose Access to Family
Planning or Options for the Terminally Ill, L.A., TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at 1.
45. Hospital Mergers Reducing Availability of Abortions, Group Says, STAR-TRIBUNE, Apr.
26, 1998, at 05E.
46. Cathy Tokarski, For Whom the Church Bell Tolls, HOSPITALS, Oct. 20, 1995, at 41-43.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Ikemoto, supra note 9, at 1102. Women who live in sparsely populated rural areas often
have little choice regarding hospitals and providers. Id. Often, a Catholic hospital is their only
alternative. Id. Across the country, forty-six Catholic hospitals are considered sole providers for
hospital services in their regions. Id.
51. Id.
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alternative facilities.52 A similar burden is placed on poor women living in
urban areas.53 Financial or transportation restrictions may limit a patient to the
services of one hospital, which may not provide the necessary community
health services that an individual desires.54
The issues surrounding access to healthcare are just beginning to be
examined by courts and legislatures. In 1994, the Center for Reproductive
Law and Policy sued a health care facility on behalf of two women who were
denied contraceptives and who received delayed services because of a Catholic
hospital’s adherence to the Directives.55 The suit involved Leonard Hospital
and St. Mary’s Hospital who merged to form Seton Health Systems.56 When
the Public Health Council approved the merger, it provided Seton with four
alternatives for handling requests for sterilization or contraceptives: (1) offer
the services requested; (2) refer patients to a provider offering the service; (3)
provide the patient with a list of providers offering the service; or (4) refer the
patient to a government agency that would provide a list of providers.57 The
Center for Reproductive Law and Policy alleged that the Public Health Council
failed to obtain adequate assurances that patients seeking these services would
receive them when they approved the merger.58 The suit was resolved under
the terms of a settlement agreement requiring Seton staff members to provide
and review with patients a detailed list of hospitals providing contraceptive or
sterilization services.59
Disputes surrounding the provision of services when a Catholic and nonCatholic hospital merge are becoming more and more commonplace. In
Baltimore, Maryland, two hospitals, St. Joseph Medical Center and the Greater
52. Id. at 1102. Ikemoto discusses the plight of two rural area hospitals, one in Everett,
Washington, and one in Lorain, Ohio. Id. In both of those cases mergers occurred between the
only two hospitals in town. Id. As a result, no other hospitals were available in the area to
provide the extinguished services. Id. Rural women either had to do without the services, or drive
long distances in order to obtain them. Id. at 1102. In addition other factors unique to a rural
lifestyle, including lower income levels, large percentages of uninsured patients, lack of public
transportation, smaller social service networks, and fewer information sources, help create
problems for rural women to find alternative providers. Id. at 1089. According to Francis
Kissling, president of Catholics for Free Choice, “These mergers have an effect on poor women,
who disproportionately seek reproductive health care in hospitals.” Hospitals & Health Systems
Catholic Hospitals: Mergers Limit Reproductive Services, AMER. POL. NETWORK, INC., Apr. 7,
1998.
53. Ikemoto, supra note 9, at 1000.
54. Id. at 1112.
55. Access: Settlement Requires Catholic Entity to Provide Referrals on Contraception,
BNA’S HEALTH REP., May 30, 1996, at d32 (discussing Amelia E. v. Public Health Council,
N.Y. Sup. Ct. (Albany Co.), No. 7062-94) [hereinafter Access].
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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Baltimore Medical Center (“GBMC”) called off merger discussions when
controversy arose “over whether the Roman Catholic religious Directives
followed by St. Joseph—prohibiting abortion, sterilization, and in-vitro
fertilization—would affect GBMC, which is known for its large range of
women’s services.”60 Under the proposed merger, a separate corporation
created by GBMC would provide abortions and in-vitro fertilization in a
separate building on hospital grounds.61 In Chicago, Loyola University
Medical Center and Oak Park’s West Suburban Hospital Medical Center ended
merger negotiations and a two-year affiliation after disagreeing over whether
physicians would continue to provide contraceptive counseling and elective
sterilizations to poor neighborhoods after the completion of the merger.62
The extent that Catholic hospitals and health care providers can object to
the provision of services that contradict the Directives is influenced, in part, by
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 and accompanying case law.
II. THE RELIANCE OF HOSPITALS AND PHYSICIANS ON CONSCIENCE CLAUSES
TO PROTECT ACTIONS
Doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers are afforded some
protection from being forced to provide health services with which they
morally or religiously disagree. The Church Amendment or conscience clause
legislation allows a health care provider to refuse to perform services that he or
she finds objectionable.63 Congress originally enacted the Church Amendment
in 1973 in response to Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hospital64 where the court forced
St. Vincent’s to perform a tubal ligation in a Catholic hospital.65 The Church
Amendment initially protected recipients of federal funds from requiring

60. M. William Salganik, St. Joseph Medical Shelves Merger Talks with GBMC; Indecision
by GBMC Prompts Move; Johns Hopkins Still a Choice, BALTIMORE SUN, May 1, 1998, at 1C.
61. Id.
62. George Gunset, Two Area Hospitals Sever Ties, CHI. TRIB., August 14, 1998, at N1.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (1988).
64. 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973), aff’d, 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 948 (1976).
65. 369 F. Supp. at 949. In Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, the Taylors brought an action to
enjoin St. Vincent’s Hospital from refusing to provide tubal ligation in combination with Mrs.
Taylor’s caesarian section. Id. Tubal ligation is a surgical sterilization procedure. Id. St.
Vincent’s, a private, charitable non-profit corporation, took over the operation of the hospital
from the Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth. Id. St. Vincent’s was one of two hospitals in
Billings, Montana. Id.Maternity services for both hospitals, St. Vincent’s and Billings Deaconess
were combined at St. Vincent’s. Id. One of the conditions of the trustees of the Sisters of Charity
was that Billings Deaconess would be prohibited from performing surgical sterilization. Id. The
Taylors obtained an injunction. Id. Shortly after the injunction was granted, Congress enacted the
Church Amendment and the district court dissolved the injunction. Id. at 951. The Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed. 523 F.2d at 75.
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participation in abortion or sterilization procedures that conflict with a
provider’s religious or moral beliefs.66
One year after passage of the Church Amendment, Congress responded to
the anti-abortion protests resulting from Roe v. Wade67 by expanding the
amendment to apply to “any healthcare provider who refused to perform any
health service or research that conflicts with personal religious or moral
beliefs.”68 In addition, institutions are barred from discriminating against
personnel because they either perform or refuse to perform procedures on
religious or moral grounds.69 Lastly, a health care institution founded on
particular religious beliefs is not required to make facilities or staff available
for sterilization or abortion services.70
Many states have adopted conscience clauses that are more limited than
federal conscience clauses.71 Most state statutes allow for the conscientious
objection to abortion, with many others covering other procedures such as
contraception, sterilization, euthanasia, and artificial insemination.72 There is
some indication that state conscience clauses need to be expanded; state courts
have not been consistent in their application of the conscience clause in the
face of Establishment Clause and right of privacy challenges.73
Courts have generally held that state law requirements that a hospital
provide certain services are unaffected by federal or state conscience clauses.
For example, the New Jersey legislature passed a conscience clause provision
preventing a hospital or staff member from being required to provide abortion
services.74 In Doe v. Bridgeton Hospital Association,75 the New Jersey
66. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a)-7 (1973).
67. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a)-7. The Conscience Clause Amendment applies to any program
administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Kathleen M. Boozang, Deciding
the Fate of Religious Hospitals in the Emerging Health Care Market, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1429,
1482 n. 253 (1995).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a)-7.
70. Id.
71. Boozang, supra note 68, at 1482. See also Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of
Conscience of Health Care Providers, J. LEGAL MED., 177, 177 (1993)(discussing the range of
conscience clauses among the forty-four states that have them).
72. Wardle, supra note 71, at 177.
73. See Doe v. Bridgeton Hospital Assoc., 366 A.2d 641 (N.J. 1976)(holding that private
non-sectarian hospitals may not refuse to make their facilities available for first trimester elective
abortion procedures), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977); Hummel v. Reiss, 589 A.2d 1041 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), aff’d, 608 A.2d 1341 (N.J. 1992)(holding that a religious hospital
may have a duty to discuss abortion when providing genetic counseling). But see Poelker v. Doe,
432 U.S. 519 (1977)(holding that a public hospital affiliated with a Catholic medical school can
refuse to provide abortion services); Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th
Cir. 1974)(upholding the use of the Church Amendment in an action against a Catholic hospital
that refused to permit the sterilization of a woman).
74. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:65A-1, A-2 (1987).
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Supreme Court held that private non-sectarian hospitals must provide first
trimester elective abortion procedures.76 Yet, the court noted that the statute
“providing that no hospital shall be required to provide abortion services or
procedures and providing that refusal to perform, to assist in the performance,
or to provide abortion services shall not constitute grounds for civil or criminal
liability, disciplinary action, or discriminatory treatment” was non-binding on a
nonsectarian nonprofit hospital because it would be an impermissible state
action frustrating a woman’s constitutional right to obtain an abortion.77 The
court cautioned in dicta that they were not making a decision regarding
whether or not religious beliefs could be grounds for a religious hospital to
prohibit elective abortions.78
In another important case, St. Agnes Hospital v. Riddick,79 a hospital
brought a civil rights action and common law due process and breach of
contract claims against a hospital accreditation association, the Accreditation
Council for Graduate Medical Education, (“ACGME”) because the association
withdrew accreditation from the hospital’s obstetrics and gynecology residency
training programs.80 ACGME withdrew accreditation because St. Agnes
Hospital did not have a resident training program in elective abortions,
sterilization, and artificial contraception due to the hospital’s adherence to the
Ethical and Religious Directives.81 The United States District Court for the
District of Maryland held that Maryland’s conscience clause statute did not

75. 366 A.2d 641 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977).
76. Id. Although the Bridgeton Hospital Association was not a Catholic hospital it did
consist of private non-profit hospitals. Doe, 366 A.2d at 643. Two women who desired abortions
visited Dr. Milner who had staff privileges at the Bridgeton hospital. Id. at 644. Although the
hospital was capable of performing the procedure, the hospital denied the doctor access. Id.
77. Id. at 647.
78. Id. “This is not to say that religious beliefs may or may not be appropriate grounds for a
hospital operated by a recognized religious body to prohibit elective abortions. We are not
passing upon the issues which may be considered in that context, particularly since the questions
are not before us and have not been fully briefed and argued by the parties.” Id.
79. 748 F. Supp. 319 (D.C. Md. 1990).
80. Id. at 320. The ACGME is a private, non-profit organization that contains a Residency
Review Committee (RRC) for each medical specialty. Id. at 321. The hospital alleged violations
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), common law due
process rights, breach of contract, and § 20-214 of the Maryland Health General Code
(conscience clause). Id. at 320. Not only does St. Agnes refuse to train their residents in these
areas, they also forbid their residence from “indirectly acquiring clinical experience that cannot
be directly obtained within the hospital.” St. Agnes, 748 F. Supp. at 322. Regarding St. Agnes’
free exercise argument, the court found that the training provision constituted a compelling
interest of adequately trained physicians. Id. at 330. In addition, the court held that there was no
less restrictive alternative with which the ACGME could use that would not sacrifice the integrity
of the system. Id. at 331.
81. Id. at 322. ACGME also cited the hospital for deficiencies in retropubic surgery, tubal
surgery, family planning and education in oncology and endocrinology. Id. at 320.
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exempt St. Agnes Hospital from providing the resident training.82 The court
held that the hospital “failed to prove that the withdrawal of accreditation was
directly related to its refusal to perform the religiously verboten procedures.”83
A hospital employee can also use a conscience clause to refuse to perform
job tasks that conflict with the employee’s religious, moral, or ethical views.84
Most conscience clauses protect employees from being required to perform or
assist with abortions or sterilization.85 In 1979, a nurse anesthetist, Marjorie
Swanson was discharged for refusing to assist with a tubal ligation.86 Swanson
cited the Montana conscience clause as the foundation for her refusal.87 The
Montana Supreme Court upheld her conscience clause objection in spite of the
fact that she had assisted in sterilization procedures on prior occasions, and
despite the fact she never cited her moral or religious beliefs in support of her
refusal.88
A similar result was reached by the Florida Court of Appeals in 1981 in
Kenny v. Ambulatory Centre of Miami, Florida, Inc.89 Margaret Kenny, a
registered nurse, alleged that she was demoted to part-time status because she
refused to assist with abortions.90 The court held that the Florida conscience
clause controlled, and that consequently she had a right to refrain from
assisting with abortions in accord with her religious beliefs.91
82. St. Agnes, 748 F. Supp. at 342. The Maryland conscience clause statute reads as follows:
(b) Hospitals—(1) A licensed hospital, hospital director, or hospital governing board may not be
required: (I) To permit, within the hospital, the performance of any medical procedure that results
in artificial insemination, sterilization, or termination of pregnancy; or (ii) To refer to any source
for these medical procedures. (2) The refusal to permit or to refer to a source for these procedures
may not be grounds for:. . .(ii)Disciplinary or other recriminatory action against the person by this
State or any person. MD. CODE. ANN., [Health-Gen.] § 20-214 (1990).
83. Id. at 342.
84. See also Margaret Davino, You Don’t Have To Care For Every Patient; Legalities of
Conscientious Objection, RN, Sept. 1996, at 63.
85. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (1973).
86. Swanson v. St. John’s Lutheran Hosp., 597 P.2d 702 (Mont. 1979).
87. Id. at 703. The Montana conscience clause reads as follows: “(2) All persons shall have
the right to refuse to advise concerning, perform, assist, or participate in sterilization because of
religious beliefs or moral convictions. If requested by any hospital or health care facility or
person desiring sterilization, such refusal shall be in writing signed by the person refusing, but
may refer generally to the grounds of ‘religious beliefs and moral convictions’. The refusal of any
person to advise concerning, perform, assist, or participate in sterilization shall not be a
consideration in respect to staff privileges of any hospital or health care facility, nor a basis for
any discriminatory, disciplinary, or other recriminatory action against such person, nor shall such
person be liable to any person for damages allegedly arising from such refusal.” MONT. CODE
ANN. § 50-5-503 (1992).
88. Swanson, 597 P.2d at 711.
89. 400 So.2d 1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
90. Id. at 1263.
91. Id. at 1267. The Florida statute reads as follows: “RIGHT OF REFUSAL. Nothing in
this section shall require any hospital or any person to participate in the termination of a
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These cases demonstrate the tensions that exist and establish the
inadequacy of conscience clauses in protecting the religious freedom of health
care providers. A right to access to health care often trumps religious rights of
hospitals and physicians to refuse to perform certain medical procedures. In
addition, constitutional rights often trump the religious rights of hospitals and
physicians to refuse to perform certain medical procedures.92 The arguments
surrounding the merger of Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals often pits the
constitutional right to religious freedom against a woman’s constitutional right
of access to necessary health services.
III. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND CITY OF BOERNE V. FLORES
A. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
When the Supreme Court first began examining cases involving free
exercise of religion, the Court focused on the intent of the clause, which was
“to leave Congress free to regulate religious practices that were subversive of
social duties or good order.”93 Gradually, this gave way to a more strict
reading of the free exercise clause by the Court. After the Court decided
Sherbert v. Verner,94 the only way a neutral state law restricting religious
freedom could pass muster was if the state showed a compelling interest and
no less restrictive way of accomplishing the same goal.95
Following Sherbert, the Supreme Court applied the compelling state
interest test with great frequency and often sustained the free exercise

pregnancy, nor shall any hospital or any person be liable for such refusal. No person who is a
member of, or associated with, the staff of a hospital nor any employee of a hospital or physician
in which or by whom the termination of a pregnancy has been authorized or performed, who shall
state an objection to such procedure on moral or religious grounds, shall be required to participate
in the procedure which will result in the termination of pregnancy. The refusal of any such
person or employee to participate shall not form the basis for any disciplinary or other
recriminatory action against such person.” FLA. STAT. ch 458.22(5) (1977).
92. See supra note 73.
93. Marie Elise Lasso, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Improves the
State of Free Exercise Doctrine, ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 569, 571 (1993), citing Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
94. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist was discharged by her
employer for her refusal to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her religion. Id. at 398. The
South Carolina Employment Security Commission refused to pay her unemployment
compensation on the grounds that her refusal to work Saturdays disqualified her for failure to
accept suitable work. Id. The Court held that neutral laws or government conduct may infringe an
individual’s religious freedom only when the state has a compelling interest and can show no
alternative, less restictive regulation. Id.
95. Id. at 406-407.
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challenges.96 However, after Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Thomas v. Review
Board,97 the Court was less willing to sustain free exercise challenges. In
1986, in Bowen v. Roy,98 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, refused
to apply the Sherbert compelling interest test.
The cases decided after the inception of the free exercise clause have set
the stage for the modern debate surrounding the creation and application of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).
The history of the creation of RFRA can be traced back to Employment
Division v. Smith.99 In Smith, petitioner Alfred Smith, a member of the Native
American Church, was dismissed from his employment because he ingested
peyote during a sacramental ritual.100 As a result, the Oregon Employment
Division denied him unemployment compensation, claiming that his use of
peyote constituted drug use in violation of state law.101 The majority held that
because Smith violated a criminal statute, the state had a valid basis for
denying him unemployment compensation.102 Smith’s religious beliefs could
not exempt his religious practice from regulation under Oregon law.103
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, explained that an analysis of the
free exercise clause does not mean “that an individual does not have an
obligation to comply with a neutral law of general applicability just because
the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes).”104 Instead, the Court held that the free exercise clause only
protects individuals from legislation that directly prohibits or compels religious
activities or practices.105 The Court also examined free exercise clause
precedent and explained that the only times the Court upheld a free exercise
claim was when the claims were “hybrid” claims, i.e., when the free exercise

96. Lasso, supra note 93, at 573. See Wisconsin v. Yoder where the Court used the
compelling state interest to hold that a Wisconsin law mandating school attendance burdened the
Amish religion. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Court held that the state’s interest in preparing citizens
to “participate effectively in society” was not compelling enough to justify the invasion. Id. at
222.
97. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
98. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
99. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
100. Id. at 874.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 884-85.
103. Id. at 885.
104. Id. at 879, citing, United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982). In Lee, an Amish
employer sought exemption from collection and payment of Social Security taxes because the
Amish religion prohibited participation in governmental support programs. 455 U.S. at 254. The
Supreme Court did not apply an exemption, holding that there would be no way to distinguish an
Amish persons objection to Social Security taxes from the religious objection that others might
have to the collection or use of other taxes. Id. at 259-260.
105. Id. at 877.
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clause was challenged among other Constitutional protections.106 This was not
the case in Smith. In addition, the Court noted the difficulties associated with
applying the compelling state interest test.107 One such difficulty is that no
guidelines exist to aid judges in determining the merits of the religious interest
involved.108 This, the majority held, would likely lead to anarchy due to the
large number of religious exemptions that would likely result.109 A more
sensible solution, Justice Scalia noted, is to leave it to the political process.110
Congress enacted RFRA in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Smith.111 Religious groups lobbied Congress for the enactment.112 RFRA was
designed to protect the free exercise of religion that the framers of the
Constitution secured as an unalienable right, from any laws, neutral or
otherwise, that may interfere with the exercise of religion without compelling
justification.113 The Act’s stated purposes are “(1) to restore the compelling
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, and Wisconsin v. Yoder, and to
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose
religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.”114 Under RFRA,
the government is prohibited from substantially burdening a person’s exercise
of religion, even if the burden is a result of a law of general applicability.115
The only exception is if it can be shown that the burden is “(1) in furtherance
of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering.”116
RFRA has been both praised and criticized. Some lauded it as a great
preserver of religious liberties while others thought that its enactment
represented an unconstitutional enlargement of legislative powers and

106. Id. at 881.
107. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 890.
111. Thomas D. Dillard, The RFRA: Two Years Later and Two Questions Threaten Its
Legitimacy, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 435, 443 (1996). In enacting RFRA, Congress used the power of
the Fourteenth Amendment which guarantees that no State shall make or enforce any law
depriving any person of “life, liberty or property, without “due process of law,” or denying any
person the “equal protection of the laws.” The Fourteenth Amendment also empowers Congress
to enforce those guarantees by legislation. Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimensions of RFRA,
14 CONST. COMMENT. 33 (1997).
112. Newman, supra note 111, at 35. See also Oliver Thomas & Bruce Fein, Is the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act Good for America?, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, December 9, 1996, at 24
(discussing the backlash against the Court by the public and Congress in response to Smith).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
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encroachment on the authority of the judiciary.117 In addition, many attorneys’
general and prison officials expressed concern with the potential for increasing
the number of lawsuits brought by prisoners for religious imposition.118
B. City of Boerne v. Flores
In Boerne, the Archbishop of San Antonio submitted an application to the
local zoning commission in order to obtain a building permit to enlarge a
church in Boerne, Texas.119 The zoning commission denied the permit because
of the presence of a local ordinance that prohibited construction affecting
historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district.120 Consequently, the
Archbishop brought suit alleging a violation of RFRA as one basis of relief.121
1. District Court
The District Court held that the enactment of RFRA was an unlawful
expansion of Congress’ power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.122 In
doing so, the court found that the enactment of RFRA violated the doctrine of
Separation of Powers by intruding on the power and duty of the judiciary.123
The court emphasized that Smith remained the law in this area “for this court to
follow pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis.”124 The court certified its
order for interlocutory appeal.125
2. The Fifth Circuit
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that Congress had authority to enact
RFRA under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.126 First,
the court used the three-part test from Katzenbach v. Morgan127 to determine
whether or not Congress exceeded its authority under Section 5 in enacting
117. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 DUKE L.J. 291, 304 (1996).
118. Dillard, supra note 111, at 449. An amendment to RFRA was filed and defeated in the
Senate. This Amendment would have exempted prisons from the application of RFRA. Id.
119. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2158.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (D.C. Texas 1995).
123. Id. at 357.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 358.
126. Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352( 5th Cir. 1996).
127. 384 U.S. 641 (1966)(holding that Congress had authority under § 5 to provide that
certain people who did not speak English could not be denied the right to vote). The Morgan
three part test as applied by the Flores Court is as follows: (1) whether RFRA can be regarded as
an enactment to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) whether RFRA is “plainly adapted to
that end;” and (3) whether RFRA is consistent “with the letter and spirit of the constitution.”
Flores, 73 F.3d at 1358-1362.
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RFRA.128 The court found that Congress enacted RFRA to enforce the rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. The court stated
that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment converted the First Amendment’s
denial of power to Congress into an authorization to Congress to make all laws
plainly adopted to secure rights of free speech and free exercise of religion.129
They found that the City’s argument that Congress’ Section 5 power is more
limited when it acts to enforce provisions other than the Equal Protection
Clause was inaccurate since Section 5 does not place conditions on Congress’
authority.130 Next, the court held that the justifications offered by Congress as
reasons for enacting RFRA clearly fit within the remedial power of Congress
under Section 5.131 Finally, the court found that RFRA did not violate
separation of powers, the Establishment Clause or the Tenth Amendment.132
3. The Supreme Court
a. Majority Opinion
As a preface to the Court’s opinion, the majority held that after
Katzenbach,133 Congress’ enforcement power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is limited to a remedial function.134 Any legislation
that alters the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held, can not
be considered “enforcement” under Section 5.135 In addition, the majority
agreed that the free exercise of religion was indeed a provision of the article
since the liberty interests inherent in the Due Process Clause include the
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.136 The majority outlined two
primary arguments against Congress’ use of its Section 5 enforcement power
to enact RFRA: the history of the Fourteenth Amendment and caselaw
interpreting the Amendment.137 In enacting RFRA, Congress was not just
merely enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment; it was dictating
the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.138 Moreover, no precedent supports

128. Id. at 1358.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Flores, 73 F.3d at 1360. The justifications as offered by the United States included; “(1)
RFRA deters governmental violations of the Free Exercise Clause; (2) RFRA prohibits laws that
have the effect of impeding religious exercise; and (3) RFRA protects the free exercise rights of
adherents of minority religions.” Id. at 1359.
132. Id. at 1361-64.
133. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651.
134. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2163.
135. Id. at 2164.
136. Id. at 2163, citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 302 (1940).
137. Id. at 2164.
138. Id.
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the idea that Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under the
Fourteenth Amendment.139
The majority argued that an examination of the Framers’ intent of the
Fourteenth Amendment reveals a remedial purpose.140 The framers rejected
the First Draft Amendment proposed by John Bingham of Ohio because the
Framers felt that it gave Congress too much power and “intruded into state
responsibility, a power inconsistent with the federal design central to the
Constitution.”141 As a result, the House delayed vote on the First Draft
Amendment. When the current Amendment was drafted, the Framers
designated Congress’ power remedial rather than plenary.142
The majority bolstered its argument by including a discussion on the Ku
Klux Klan Act143 that was passed a few years after the Amendment’s
ratification.144 Representative James Garfield argued that there were limits on
Congress’ enforcement power, “unless we ignore both the history and the
language of these clauses we cannot, by any reasonable interpretation, give to
§ 5 . . . the force and effect of the rejected [Bingham] clause.”145
Next, the majority examined the Civil Rights cases to distinguish
Congress’ remedial and enforcement power. The early Civil Rights Acts146
proscribed criminal penalties for denying any person “the full enjoyment of
public accommodations.”147 The Civil Rights Acts were invalidated by the
Supreme Court as an attempt to regulate private conduct.148 In response, the
Court held that Congress had no authorization to pass “general legislation upon
the rights of the citizen, but corrective legislation, that is, such as may be
necessary and proper for counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or
enforce.”149 Next the majority distinguished South Carolina v. Katzenbach150
where the Court upheld the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”)151 because they were
“remedies aimed at areas where voting discrimination has been most
flagrant.”152
139. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
140. Id. at 2164.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2165.
143. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 ch. 22 § 2, 17 stat. 13, 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1985 (3)(1982)).
144. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2165.
145. Id. at 2166.
146. Ch. 114, 18 stat. 335 (1875)(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1994)).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2166.
150. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
151. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § § 1971, 1973 1973bb-1 (1988)).
152. Id. at 2167.
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This was tempered by a discussion of recent cases where the Court has
considered whether Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under the
Fourteenth Amendment.153 In particular, the majority examined Oregon v.
Mitchell,154 where the Court held that Congress exceeded its enforcement
powers by enacting legislation lowering the minimum age of voters from 21 to
18 in state and local elections. The majority held that this was an intrusion into
an area typically reserved to the states.155
In discussing specifically whether RFRA was a proper exercise of
congressional power, the majority held that there must be some congruency
between the means used to adopt remedial measures and the ends to be
achieved.156 The majority compared RFRA with the VRA. The VRA was
sustained because it was supported by “examples of modern instances of
generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry.”157 Bolstered by
comments made during Congressional Committee hearings, the same is not
true for RFRA.158 In addition, the majority stated that RFRA is not remedial or
preventive because its “sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level
of government.”159 In comparison, the VRA was confined to regions of the
country where voting discrimination was most flagrant, only affected a discrete
class of state laws, and had a termination date.160 Because RFRA reaches into
the area of broad, neutral legislation, its sweep is too broad and will displace a
large proportion of state and federal legislation.161 The overreaching scope of
RFRA distinguishes it from other congressional legislation that falls within the
purview of Congress’ enforcement power.162
The majority also criticized the inherent RFRA test.163 The required
showing of a substantial burden on religious freedom is difficult to contest.164
The test, which requires the state to show a compelling governmental interest
and least restrictive alternative is one of the most stringent tests in
Constitutional law and, according to the majority, makes it fairly easy for
objectors to win.165

153. Id.
154. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
155. Id.
156. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2169.
157. Id.
158. Id. The Court examined the legislative history of RFRA and found that there was no
testimony concerning cases of religious persecution occurring within the past 40 years. Id.
159. Id. at 2170.
160. Id.
161. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2171. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
164. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2171.
165. Id. at 2171.
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For the foregoing reasons, and because Marbury v. Madison166 allows the
Court to do so, the majority of the Court held that Congress exceeded its
powers in enacting the RFRA.
b. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens’ brief concurrence centered not on whether Congress
exceeded its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but whether
RFRA violates the First Amendment freedom of religion clause.167 Justice
Stevens stated that by enacting RFRA, Congress gave a preference in favor of
the establishment of religion.168 The Catholic Church in Boerne sought special
application of a generally applicable, neutral law.169 Simply stated, RFRA
should not provide an exemption from a law when atheists or agnostics cannot
obtain the same or similar relief.170
c. Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia’s concurrence attacked Justice O’Connor’s dissent in
Boerne. First, he addressed Justice O’Connor’s claim that the decision in
Smith was inconsistent with historical protections of religion.171 Justice Scalia
argued that historical statutes172 protecting the free exercise of religion
protected action taken “for,” “in respect of,” or “on account of” one’s religion,
or “discriminatory” action to the exclusion of all others.173 This, Justice Scalia
argued, did not encompass the neutral, generally applicable laws that the
dissent discussed.174
In addition, he criticized Justice O’Connor’s use of the “provisos” found in
the early statutes.175 According to Justice Scalia, the provisos indicate exactly
what Smith held, that the free exercise of religion is tolerated as long as it does
not disturb neutral, generally applicable statutes.176
Next, Justice Scalia analyzed the dissent’s analysis of the framer’s
intent.177 Justice Scalia contended that the historical documentation of the
166. Id. at 2172, citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch)(1803).
167. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2172-73 (Scalia, J., concurring).
172. Historical statutes include the Maryland Act Concerning Religion of 1649, Rhode Island
Charter of 1663, New Hampshire Constitution, Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776,
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, New York Constitution, Maryland Act Concerning Religion of
1649, and the Georgia Constitution. Id.
173. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2173 (Scalia, J., concurring).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2174.
177. Id.
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framers only supports their views of what constitutes the “proper” relationship
between government and religion and does not advance the idea that these
things should be constitutionally protected.178
d. Justice O’Connor
The driving force behind Justice O’Connor’s dissent was her belief that the
Court in Employment Division v. Smith did not properly interpret the Free
Exercise Clause and used an erroneous standard.179 As an introduction to her
opinion, she examined how the Free Exercise Clause guarantees that
individuals may participate in religious practices without impermissible
government interference.
At the crux of her opinion, she relied on the fact that the aforementioned
interpretation of Smith is inconsistent with precedent or history.180 Justice
O’Connor traced the history of the inception of the Free Exercise Clause
finding that the intent of the framers in incorporating the Free Exercise Clause
was to prevent the government from adopting laws that discriminated against
religion.181 Two other important events also evidence this intent. First, the
framers specifically included protection for religion in the Bill of Rights, and,
second, the principles of free exercise were first articulated in this country in
the early colonies.182 In addition, history reveals that the framers viewed
religion as integral to society and thus accorded the free exercise of religion a
“special constitutional status.”183 As a result, interference in the religious
activities of Americans should be seriously examined.184
IV. ANALYSIS: THE IMPACT OF THE CITY OF BOERNE ON SERVICES MERGED
HOSPITALS PROVIDE
The ability of a Catholic hospital to provide prohibited services is dictated
by the Directives issued by the Pope.185 When a provider chooses to make
prohibited services unavailable, it is freely exercising their religious beliefs as
dictated by the Directives. Prior to the enactment of RFRA in 1993, religious
freedom was accorded little protection from generally applicable laws.186

178. Id. at 2175.
179. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2176 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 2177.
181. Id. at 2178. “The record instead reveals that its drafters and ratifiers more likely viewed
the Free Exercise Clause as a guarantee that government may not unnecessarily hinder believers
from freely practicing their religion, a position consistent with our pre-Smith jurisprudence.” Id.
182. Id. at 2179.
183. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2185 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
184. Id.
185. Directives, supra note 20. See also, Hochberg, supra note 2, at 951.
186. Neuman, supra note 111, at 33 (discussing Employment Division which abandoned the
compelling interest test).
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After RFRA was enacted, religious freedom gained greater protection.187
During this time, RFRA was used as the basis for many legal actions.188 Since
the Supreme Court overturned RFRA, critics of the decision fear that it will be
more difficult for individuals claiming infringement of religious freedom to
succeed in court.189 The Boerne decision is likely to impact newly merged
Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals that discontinue or fail to provide
necessary community health services. Another troublesome area includes
accreditation of Catholic hospitals that fail to teach abortion techniques or
birth-control counseling.190
The constitutional right to refuse to provide treatment that conflicts with a
health care provider’s religious beliefs has never been more uncertain. Many
questions remain uncertain, such as whether the Free Exercise Clause protects
a Catholic hospital’s objections to a patient’s treatment request? Will the
Supreme Court, after overturning RFRA, protect a state’s interest in
guaranteeing access to patient care to protect a religiously affiliated hospital’s
self-identified mission?191 Under RFRA, any challenges regarding the
provision of services at a Catholic hospital withstood greater protection. The
overturning of RFRA leaves religious freedom on shaky ground. According to
Kathleen Boozang, under the Smith test a hospital could defend its policy or
mission against a generally applicable neutral law forcing it to provide
treatment by trying to fall within one of the two exceptions set out in Smith.
Boozang stated that hospitals would likely succeed under the second exception
by presenting a hybrid argument on the ground that the law conflicts with
another constitutional interest.192 Boozang also states that the transmission of
AIDS would be a sufficiently compelling state interest that would outweigh
any religious freedom argument in favor of the provision of birth control.193

187. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
188. George F. Will, WASH. POST, June 29, 1997, at CO7. People and institutions have
based challenges on RFRA for many of the basic exercises of states’ traditional powers, from
highway improvements to health and safety regulations. Id. Following the enactment of RFRA,
approximately 200 cases were brought by prison inmates claiming that RFRA protects rights such
as drug use, dress and grooming requirements. Id.
189. Michael Kirkland, RFRA Decision: Anti-Religion Ripples, U.P.I., August 14, 1997(citing
Mark Stern, legal director for the American Jewish Congress, stating that the overturn of RFRA
affects zoning decisions on religious buildings across the country). The overturning of RFRA has
an affect on tithing and bankruptcy, prison access for ministers and priests, and accreditation of
religious clubs in schools and on college campuses. Id. See also St. Agnes Hospital 748 F. Supp.
at 319.
190. Kirkland, supra note 189. Under RFRA, Catholic hospitals who do not want to teach
abortion techniques would have a better chance of justifying their actions.
191. See Boozang, supra note 68, at 1505.
192. Id. at 1499.
193. Id. at 1504.
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States are beginning to become more proactive in their attempt to protect
an individual’s right to receive necessary services. For instance, New York
state legislators recently introduced a bill that would require the state Health
Commissioner to ensure that hospitals continue providing contraception,
sterilization and abortion services after merging with facilities that do not
historically provide those services.194 Under RFRA, newly merged Catholic
hospitals would have a greater ability to successfully challenge this and similar
legislation. After all, it would be easier under RFRA as opposed to Smith, to
show that the generally applicable statute significantly impacts the hospital’s
free exercise of religion.195 Without RFRA, a state law can more easily pass
muster as the state will not have to prove the existence of a compelling state
interest.
The rejection of RFRA signifies a return to less protection of religious
freedom. Now hospitals, physicians, and other health providers, unable to gain
protection from RFRA are less able to refuse to provide necessary services. As
a result, Catholic health providers are not exempt from a generally applicable
law that hampers religious freedom. This is a return to the climate prevalent
when Smith was decided.196
However, there is a question regarding whether or not the overturn of
RFRA will impact the provision of necessary services. While RFRA was in
effect few cases, if any, were filed involving a hospital seeking protection
under RFRA for failing to provide services. The cases that were filed
involving issues of access to health care, including the case involving the Seton
System in New York,197 were settled with the end result the institution of
patient referral services.198 Does the lack of cases involving this issue
foreshadow little change now that RFRA has been overturned?
Evidence indicates that the issue of religious freedom is still omnipresent.
Legislators are currently attempting to reach a compromise regarding RFRA
and the free exercise of religion issues.199 The Supreme Court held that
Congress overstepped massive legislative boundaries in enacting RFRA.200 As
a result of prior struggles, Congress is currently attempting to reach a middle
194. Sylvia Wood, Bill Aims to Maintain Services After Hospital Mergers, TIMES UNION,
June 10, 1998, at B9.
195. The pre-RFRA issue was that courts were dismissing individual’s free exercise
complaints because the statute or law invoked was generally applicable and did not specify
religious exemption. RFRA was designed to prevent these decisions.
196. The legislature is required to show a compelling governmental interest in order to defend
against a free exercise of religion claim.
197. Access, supra note 55. (discussing Amelia E. v. Public Health Council, N.Y. Sup. Ct.
(Albany Co.), No. 7062-94).
198. Id.
199. T. R. Goldman, Lawmakers Take Steps to Respond After Legislation is Found
Unconstitutional, LEGAL TIMES, July 14, 1997, at 8.
200. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
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ground in the religious freedom arena.201 At this time it is looking at
alternatives such as the creation of a constitutional amendment protecting
religious freedom and reintroduction of portions of the 1993 RFRA.202
However, regardless of whether RFRA is resurrected, in order to resolve
these issues, the legislature, the judiciary, and health care providers must reach
an agreement. While it is undesirable to require Catholic hospitals to act in
opposition to the religious Directives and provide certain services, Catholic
hospitals who merge with non-Catholic hospitals and insist that the Directives
govern services provided must recognize that these prohibited services are
necessary to many individuals, primarily women who lack the financial
resources to take advantage of alternative healthcare sources.
In order for Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals to reach an agreement,
there must be a compromise of institutional values. Sale negotiation should
include discussion of the availability of necessary services prohibited by the
Directives.203 Within the negotiation process, it may be possible for both
parties to reach an agreement to provide the services in an alternative building
or to simply require physicians to provide referrals.204
In addition, Catholic hospitals must closely examine the patients and the
community they serve. Many Catholic hospitals profess to be charitable and
many are required to provide charitable service in order to be eligible to
receive tax-exempt status.205 In fact, many Catholic and non-Catholic hospital
mergers are successful, in part, because Catholic hospitals tend to make

201. Telephone Interview with Joanne Hustead, Women’s Legal Defense Fund (Oct. 1997).
Congress began conducting hearings in front of the House Judiciary panel’s Constitutional
subcommittee on July 14, 1997. Goldman, supra note 199, at 8. In addition, many states are
drafting their own version of RFRA. See, e.g., Llen Oxman, AG Wants State Religious Liberty
Law, NAT’L L.J. July 14, 1997, at A8; Marcia M. McBrien, House Passes Religious Rights Bill,
MICH. LAW. WKLY., July 14, 1997, at 41; Ed Briggs, Virginia Looks at Religious Rights, TIMES
UNION, September 6, 1997, at E2.
202. Goldman, supra note 199.
203. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 16, at A1(discussing the merger of St. Jerome and Genesee
Memorial hospitals in Batavia, New York where the hospitals are trying to work out a deal with
local physicians operating a surgery center to handle tubal ligation; Access, supra note
55(discussing the settlement agreement between reproductive rights groups and a health care
facility resulting from the merger of a Catholic hospital and a non-sectarian facility to provide
patient referrals).
204. Davis supra note 16, at A1. In a New York merger between Catholic St. Jerome
Hospital and secular Genesee Memorial Hospital, hospital officials had at first agreed to build a
free standing outpatient surgery center to perform tubal ligation. Id. However, this proved too
expensive, so now officials are trying to create a referral and transport system so women who
desire tubal ligation immediately after giving birth may be transferred immediately. Id. See also
Casey, supra note 19.
205. Ikemoto, supra note 9, at 1091. Catholic hospitals are tax exempt under § 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code. Id. As a result, Catholic hospitals must provide a large amount of
subsidized care to the elderly, disabled, and low-income patients. Id.
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excellent partners due to their commitment to quality care and concern for the
poor and underserved.206
Regardless of their strong commitment to their values, it is likely that
market pressures will induce Catholic hospitals to provide services prohibited
by the Directives.207 For instance, Catholic hospitals forced to compete for
managed care contracts are rapidly increasing the breadth of available
services.208
Recently, the Alaska Supreme Court held in Valley Hospital v. Mat-Su
Coalition for Choice,209 that a quasi-public hospital must provide abortion
services.210 The court’s decision was based on both the Supreme Court of
Alaska’s interpretation of the United States Constitution and on the protection
of privacy in the Alaska constitution.211 In doing so, the court held that
“reproductive rights are fundamental, and [that] they are encompassed within
the right to privacy expressed in article I, section 22 of the Alaska
Constitution.”212 In addition, the court held that the hospital did not advance
any “medical, safety or other public-welfare interest to justify precluding
elective abortions.”213 Not even the existence of a conscience clause hampered

206. Carmen F. Deyesu. Making the Case for St. Joseph Medical Center, BALTIMORE SUN,
June 25, 1998, at 23A.
207. Boozang, supra note 68, at 1492. Many women seek sterilization immediately following
childbirth. If a Catholic hospital refuses to accommodate this request, it is likely that female
patients will choose a non-Catholic hospital for birthing/delivery services. Id. In addition, many
insurance companies refuse to pay for sterilization that is not performed immediately following
childbirth, due to the increased costs associated with delayed sterilization. Id.
208. Id. “Third party payers, striving to lower or avoid large health care expenditures, may
not cover sterilizations that do not occur concurrent with a recent delivery and are more likely to
contract with hospitals that provide both obstetrics and sterilization services.” Id.
209. 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997).
210. Id. Ten women filed suit through the Mat-Su Coalition for Choice seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief. Valley Hospital is a 36 bed facility owned by a non-profit corporation. Id.
at 965. In September, 1992, the operating board of the corporation enacted a policy prohibiting
abortions at the hospital unless “(1) there is documentation by one or more physicians that the
fetus has a condition that is incompatible with life; (2) the mother’s life is threatened; or (3) the
pregnancy is a result of rape or incest.” Id. at 965. The court held that Valley Hospital was
“quasi-public” based on two main factors: (1) The hospital participated in the State’s Certificate
of Need program which provides that the State must “review and approve expenditures of one
million dollars or more for construction or alteration of a health care facility; and (2) the hospital
received construction funds, land and operating funds from state, local, and federal governments.”
Id. at 971.
211. Id. at 966-967. See also Natalie Phillips, Abortion Ban Not Allowed; Court Denies
Appeal by Valley Hospital, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 22, 1997, at 1A; Tom Fink, Court’s
Abortion Decision is ‘Out of Step’, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Dec. 8, 1997, at 4B.
212. Valley Hospital, 948 P.2d at 968. Article I, Section 22 of the Alaska Constitution reads
as follows: “The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed.” Id.
213. Id. at 971.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1997]

FREEDOM AT RISK

181

the court in its decision.214 In a revealing footnote, the court indicated that a
free exercise of religion argument may be raised when the issue is applied to
religious based hospitals or providers.215
The Valley Hospital decision indicates that at least one state supreme court
is willing to take a stand and force public and quasi-public institutions to
perform abortions, regardless of a doctor’s religious or moral views or the
institution’s religious affiliation.
V. CONCLUSION
The merger of Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals dramatically effects the
provision of necessary health services. Unfortunately, necessary health
services directly impact women, particularly women who reside in rural areas
and women of lower income levels.
The exact impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne v.
Flores is yet unknown. However, action must be taken to ensure that all
Americans have access to health care. At present, it is likely that the rejection
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act may be a positive sign to those
attempting to ensure access to health care. Arguably whatever happens in this
debate, it is important that a healthy balance is struck between the religious
rights of providers and the individuals seeking access. Many newly merged
Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals have successfully preserved the provision
of these necessary services through compromise and collaboration.
Compromise and collaboration are integral to ensuring access to healthcare for
all.
HEATHER L. CARLSON

214. Id. at 971-72. ALASKA SESS. LAWS 18.16.010(b) reads as follows: “Nothing in this
section requires a hospital or person to participate in an abortion, nor is a hospital or person liable
for refusing to participate in an abortion under this section.” Id. The court held that Valley
Hospital had only a “sincere moral belief” that elective abortion was wrong. Id. at 972. In
addition, the Alaska Attorney General has stated that this statute should be invalid unless it is
construed to apply only to sectarian hospitals. Id.
215. Valley Hospital, 948 P.2d at 971. “Nothing said in this opinion should be taken to
suggest that a quasi-public hospital could have a policy based on the religious tenets of its
sponsors which could be a compelling state interest. Recognizing such a policy as ‘compelling’
could violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
As this point is not raised, we do not rule on it.” Id. n. 18.

